D-Day Was Staged Too – Part 1 & Part 2 (Hitler The Jew And The Faked WW2)

FYI.

Related info:

Adolf Hitler has been a Freemason and an Illuminati (Rothschild and the other 12 elite families) puppet from the start.

Masonic handshake between Hitler and Himmler

Down below you’ll find more masonic handshakes/signs and Illuminati hand signs by Adolf Hitler.

WW2 has been a staged event.

Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill have also been Freemasons and Illuminati puppets.

Other well known Freemasons and Illuminati puppets are/have been:

Obama, the Bush’s, the Clinton’s, Cheney, Trump, Gorbachev, Putin, Xi Jinping, Merkel, May, Cameron, Brown, Blair, Sarkozy, Hollande, Macron, etc.

TPTB have WW3 planned for us.

Hitler hired Hjalmar Schacht to run the Reichsbank.

Now look up who created the BIS, the central bank of central banks!!!

*****

– D-Day was staged too (part 1/2):

Since the result of the landing could be quite random, once again, Jewish leaders had to stage the event.

A failure of the landing was out of the question. Indeed, the USSR was about to crush Germany. And as it would have taken a year or two to repeat a similar operation, it would have been very difficult to justify a stagnation of the Eastern Front during all this time. And without a stagnating front, the USSR would have conquered most of Europe, and would have put communist governments everywhere. And such a thing was not part of the plans of Jewish leaders. And if Stalin had put communist governments in some countries and not in others, again it would have been difficult to justify.

So, Hitler and the German High Command had to help the Allies win, by reacting too slowly and inadequately. That’s why, once again, we see the presence of many quirks, inconsistencies, “errors” too numerous and too big to be honest, as well as hazards a little too good to be true; all this, mainly on the German side of course, but not only.

1) Before the landing: staged disagreements between Rommel and Rundstedt

The failure of the Germans against the landing comes not only from mistakes made during June 6, but of course also from those made before. The Jewish leaders had to set up a losing strategy before the events happen. That makes sense. Sabotage organized by them on D-Day was in the right direction, but it was not enough. They had to optimize far more the organization of the German failure. And for that, they had to organize things in advance.

One of the most significant errors comes from Hitler’s arbitration of the disagreement between Rommel and Rundstedt regarding the strategy; disagreement certainly also staged.

Rommel argued that everything would happen on the D-day, and that after, all would be lost, particularly because of Allied aircraft. He therefore recommended maintaining the German divisions closer to the beaches, in order to crush the landing in the bud.

Rundstedt, his superior, argued instead that it was impossible to defend the beaches, because of the power of the allied naval artillery. He also thought that at one moment of their advance, the allied forces would be more or less disorganized and therefore winnable. As a result, he advocated attacking them soon after their first attack, once the Navy could no longer support them.

So it was for Hitler to decide. And of course, he made sure to take the worst decision possible in order to make allies win.

Indeed, he chose to compromise and take a bit of Rommel’s plan and a little from that of Rundstedt. Thus, he left some divisions on the beaches and put some other ones behind, in the inner land.

Thus, the troops on the beaches were not powerful enough to repel the Allies to the sea, and the remaining troops in the back were not able either to defeat them once bridgeheads created. So the troops near the beaches were sure to be defeated and those located further inland too.

But that’s not all. Hitler also complicated the decision circuit for his armies located in the west of Europe. Indeed, he insisted that the Panzer troop’s reserves be placed under his direct orders. They therefore could not move without his approval.

It already posed a problem in itself, since managing divisions located 1,800 km away makes necessarily the commandment less effective. But above all, because Hitler was asleep during the early hours of D-day, and after that, because he was slow to give the order to move them, they remained stuck for hours before being able to intervene, letting the allies quietly create their bridgeheads. Obviously, this too was wanted. Hitler chose this organization to ensure that critical units would be paralyzed during the D-day in order to let the allies win.

Incidentally, some of these armored divisions will be put very far back, as the Panzer Lehr, which will be located about 130 km from the landing beaches, the 116th Panzer Division, located 130 km away, near Rouen, and especially the second panzer division (320 km); too far away to intervene quickly enough on D-Day. It happens that, among these units, there are two that belong to the reserve of Army Group B, and are therefore immediately available, without having to refer to Hitler. If for the 116th, one can understand the need to cover the area near Dieppe, the placement of the second division is completely illogical.

2) Maps of German troops and airdrops areas

Before going further, here is the map of the German troops.

To understand the map, here is the signification of the symbols. From the highest level of command to the lowest, we have:

OB West (commands the army groups located in Western Europe. Directed by Gerd von Rundstedt)

xxxxx = Army Group (for the area going from Brittany to northern France: Army Group B, led by Rommel)

xxxx = Army (here 7th and 15th armies)

xxx = corps (the one that concerns us here is the LXXXIV or 84th corps)

xx = division; this is where the troops are. The higher levels are usually only HQ. A division consists of about 12,000 men in 1944 and is divided into regiments (2,000 to 3,000 men) battalions (750-1000 men). For panzer divisions, there are about 15,000 men (added to this: 90 Panzer IV and 70 Panthers).

The divisions with a cross inside the rectangle are infantry divisions, those with an oval are armored divisions, and those with nothing are static divisions.

Infantry

Tanks

Allied airdrops zones are here:

3) Many high-ranking generals were absent

Jewish leaders have therefore planned the German defeat upstream of the D-Day. But, as the landing still contained a large amount of uncertainty, it was necessary to organize the defeat also for this day.

For that, Jewish leaders ensured that many Germans officials would be absent June 6 (until noon or even until late evening), and essential information about the landing would not be transmitted to or not believed by German HQ.

The main reason that will justify officially these absences will be that the weather was extremely bad the days before June 6 and that the Germans then thought that the landing could not be made before June 10.

Thus, about the navy, Admiral Krancke leaves his headquarters in Paris to make an inspection visit to Bordeaux.

Colonel Mayer-Detring, the intelligence officer for the entire western front, goes hunting with his mistress.

More importantly, General Rommel who heads the Army Group B (15th and 7th armies) is authorized to be absent for 36 hours to celebrate on June 6 in Germany, the anniversary of his wife. Army Group B, it is precisely the whole group of troops located in the northwest of France. Its operations officer, von Tempelhoff, left too. 

Dollmann, Commander of the 7th army, must make a Kriegspiel (a war game) in Rennes, June 6, at 10 am, with the following theme: exercise on maps about air landing. All division commanders are summoned, each with two corps commanders. All are invited to sleep at Rennes on the night of June 5 to 6. Thus, it’s almost half of the division leaders and a quarter of the regiment leaders who are en route to or are already in Rennes as Operation Overlord begins.

And the 7th Army is the only one present in Normandy. The 15th army is in the north of France, about 200 km from the landing beaches; that is to say, much too far away to get there in time during the D-day.

And even if the cause is different, the general Wilhem Falley, commanding the 91th Division, is killed shortly after 4 am near his headquarters, that he tries to reach. We can also think that his death was staged so that the functioning of this very important division is idle for the few crucial hours before landing.

General Feuchtinger, commanding the 21th Panzer Division, is in Paris for a rendezvous with his mistress. So this crucial division is also without its official chief.

So, the only army that can deal with the allies during the first day of landing is partly decapitated at the crucial moment. Of course, there are substitutes, but it is not exactly the same.

In summary, for the area of the 7th Army, we had, from the highest to the lowest ranking (those who were there are in bold):

• Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, supreme commander of the German forces on the western front. Present.

• Rommel, who commands the Army Group B: missing (in the south of Germany) (replaced by Hans Speidel).

• Friedrich Dollmann commanding the 7th Army: missing (in Rennes for the wargame, replaced by Max Pemsel).

• Erich Marcks commanding the 84th Army Corps of the 7th army: present.

• Divisions present in the area, and being free to intervene, were: 711, 716, 352, 91, 709, 243, and armored 21st. So, seven divisions in all.

• • The 91st is leaderless since Wilhem Falley was killed at around 4 am.
  • The 21st Panzer is leaderless. Edgar Feuchtinger is in Paris.
  • The 709th is leaderless. Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben is indeed asleep in his hotel in Rennes. He will arrive at his post at noon (according to the book “D-Day 1944 Utah Beach & the US Airborne Landings”, By Steven J. Zaloga, page 12).
  • The 352nd Division is commanded by Generalleutnant Dietrich Kraiss. This one was present because he was suspicious (see here). Thus, he didn’t go to the wargame.
  • The 711th Division is commanded by Generalleutnant Josef Reichert, who is present. This is because he doesn’t belong to the 7th Army, and thus, does not participate to the wargame.
  • The 716th Division, commanded by Generalleutnant Wilhelm Richter: present.
  • The 243rd Division, commanded by Generalleutnant Heinz Hellmich. Absent: gone to Rennes.

So, only 3 of the 7 divisions are commanded in the early hours of the landing. 57% have no commandment. And part of the regiments leaders are also absent.

The thing is not very well documented, but inevitably, it had to have an impact on the responsiveness and the quality of the German defense during the landing.

That said, here, it is said, regarding the death of General Falley: “This action will have a direct impact on the course of events in the Utah Beach sector, as it will cause a significant fluctuation in the command of the division during several hours and significantly delay the German counter-attack“.

Perhaps also that some of the generals sent to the war game were not informed about the sabotage and were kept away for this reason. Had they been present, they would have been able to think that there was a betrayal from the high command.

Here is the German organization chart in Normandy for the period of the 5/6 June 1944:

4) The probable goal of Rommel’s absence

The absence of Rommel is not negligible for the failure of the German defense. Insofar, as he is the one who recommended the defense of beaches, had he been present, he would have greatly accelerate and energize things. In particular, it would be logical that he bring back as soon as possible the 116th and 2nd Panzer Divisions; and that he make the 21st Panzer rush at the beaches.

Also, Jodl refused that Rundstedt use the 12th Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehr and also refused to wake Hitler. Probably if Rommel had been there, as he was supposed to be one of the favorite generals of Hitler, it would have been difficult to justify Jodl’s inaction.

While as Rundstedt was neither convinced of the strategy of stopping the Allies on the beaches nor of the fact that the Normandy landing was the real one, it was easier to justify a lack of insistence from him toward Jodl.

Incidentally, Rommel was most likely in the conspiracy too. This photo of him doing a masonic handshake with Hitler shows it:

Casting of the TV series “Band of Brother”

So, anyway, he would have done nothing. But it would have been more difficult to explain. It was therefore better to keep him away.

5) The advantage of the absence of the divisional generals

In my opinion, the usefulness of the thing wasn’t necessarily about the action during the time of the landing, but about what was to happen overnight. It was necessary that the German units near Utah Beach (the 709th, 91st and 243rd) can’t react fast enough to get rid of paratroopers. Because then, they could have intervened on Utah Beach the next day and prevent a successful landing at this location.

You have to consider that behind the beaches in question, the area was mostly marshland. And there were very few routes crossing it. If the Germans had managed to keep the roads and therefore the beaches, the landing would have been much more complicated. But, precisely, the roads have been taken by the Allied paratroopers overnight.

Map 1

Indeed, we can read on Wikipedia about the Utah Beach battle:

“The most significant difference was the 13 000 men of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Division already fighting in the interior at the beginning of the landing. Five hours before the first wave of assault, the troops who have been parachuted or have arrived by gliders fought beyond the beaches, eliminating the enemy positions along the beach exits and creating confusion among the Germans, preventing any organized counter-attack from the enemy toward the landing areas.”

Or on this other Wikipedia page: “Although the paratroopers are quite dispersed and suffer heavy losses, they manage to take over and keep most of the roads necessary for the exit of the 7th US Corps from Utah Beach.”

We must also see that there were only 10,000 paratroopers in this area, facing almost two German divisions (91th, part of the 709th and 352nd,); which represented around 20,000 men. And if things had been done well, part of the 243rd could have been brought on site. The allies were clearly outnumbered. And of course, a night drop in bad weather tends to induce disorganization. Allied divisions were even more disorganized, because a part landed in fairly deep swamps. And besides that, the Germans had had time during the previous months to strongly reinforce the points they controlled, making them very difficult to be taken by the paratroopers. So, if the chiefs of those three German divisions had been present during the hours before the landing, the reaction of the latter might have been faster, more coordinated and more powerful. And then, maybe the landing on Utah Beach in the morning would have been a failure.

And Utah Beach was very important because it allowed taking faster the port of Cherbourg, located about thirty kilometers away (north-west). Without the taking of this beach, the port was located at 60 km. And it became much more difficult to conquer.

There are only two ports in deep water allowing to transfer huge amounts of material in Normandy: Cherbourg and Le Havre. Without the taking of Cherbourg, the allies could have been without a single major port for a long time; which would have led to a much slower arrival of the supply. Since one of the two artificial harbors built by the Allies was destroyed on June 19, there were only 10,000 tons of material that could pass through the second port daily. Imagine that both artificial harbors were destroyed on this occasion, it could have been a disaster.

Incidentally, you can notice that after the landing, Hitler will still make decisions leading to the rapid defeat of the troops located in this area. By ordering them to not retreat at any cost, Hitler hastened their surrender and thus the fall of Cherbourg. The city fell on June 30, while apparently they could have resisted much longer without the huge losses caused by the order of not retreating. If in the meantime, the last artificial harbor had been destroyed by a storm, there again, it could have posed enormous logistical problems to the allies.

Moreover, not only Utah could have been not conquered, but it could have been the case for Omaha. With German troops in number near Utah, some could have reinforced Omaha. And as the Germans have been very close of keeping the control of the beach, it could also have been a failure for the Allies.

And of course, this idea about Utah Beach area is valid, to a lesser extent, for Sword Beach. The absence of Feuchtinger at the head of the 21th Panzer (and the hesitations of the high commandment of course) has probably decreased the effectiveness of it. Maybe Sword Beach could have been held if he had been present.

So, for the Jewish leaders, there had to be some confusion on the German side during the early hours. Without that, the success of the operation on the side of Utah Beach became much more random; and possibly also on the side of Omaha and Sword Beach. And Jewish leaders don’t like hazard. And to increase the confusion, they made sure that the chiefs of divisions be not there. It helped to have some more few hours of mess; enough for the paratroopers to hold the area and ensure the success of a part of the landing.

6) The advantage of not waking Hitler

One of the biggest quirks is of course the fact that subordinates of Hitler did not dare to wake him.

The landing began at 6am. At that time, things were already perfectly clear. And if there was still any doubt, at 7am, it no longer existed. Even at 3 o’clock, things were already quite obvious. Yet Hitler was woken at 10am. Many hours during which nothing was done.

It happens that panzers could only move on his order. And everything could be played within hours. It was an absolutely crucial moment where the reaction had to be as quick as possible.

The justification for not waking Hitler is based on the fact that he is supposed to have required not to be woken up and had taken a sleeping pill. This explanation is ridiculous.

If you had been the subordinate of Hitler at that time, above all, you would have been terrified of being court-martialed for not having warned him in time about the landing; and certainly not for having awakened him. Not warning the supreme leader at such a crucial moment is indeed clearly liable to the death penalty. Such failure is unforgivable. And Hitler was especially not known to be a weak or a tender person. Thus, subordinates knew they were risking their head. Even without considering the possible punishment from Hitler’s, his near entourage of generals knew that a successful Allied landing would mean the end of Germany in the short term, and then their possible judgment and execution. Therefore, the decision not to wake Hitler is extremely fishy.

Of course, Hitler had repeatedly said that the first landing would only be a diversion. But at 6am, even if it was a trick, it was necessary to react as quickly as possible. Otherwise, diversion or not, the allies would progress farther in the French territory and it would quickly become impossible to throw them back to the sea. And neither Hitler nor the other generals were soothsayers and really knew what was going to happen. So they could not play the fate of Germany on a simple presume. In the absence of certainty, it was absolutely necessary to react as soon as possible to prevent the success of the invasion of Normandy. Obviously, it was a major operation. And even if it was not the main landing, if the German didn’t make it fail, then it might well have become it. So the German high command could not handle this in an offhand way, as a secondary issue. They had to react as quickly as possible and awaken Hitler. This, a 10 year old child would have understood.

The fact of not having awakened Hitler therefore represents an obvious sabotage. With what we have seen above, we understand the advantage of not waking him. His permission was needed to use the panzer divisions located far away from the coast of Normandy. With Hitler asleep, the authorization relied on Jodl (apparently, since generally you don’t heard about Keitel, his superior). Then, Jewish leaders just needed to present him as servile follower and a very prudent person (this is also how Keitel was portrayed) to justify that he has not woken up Hitler and not authorized the use of panzers. Thus, the Jewish leaders were able to ensure that these units would be locked during the crucial moment; whereas if they had been available during the early hours of the landing, it is quite possible that they would have been able to reject the Allies into the sea.

With Hitler woken up, it would have been hard to justify that these divisions were not sent sooner, especially the 2nd and 12th Panzer and the panzer Lehr.

So the fact that his subordinates did not dare to wake him was clearly intended, planned. It allowed the allies to gain enough time to make the landing a success.

Of course, we can say that anyway, air units would have massacred the panzers and making them intervene earlier would have changed nothing. But until about 16h, the clouds did not allow allied airplanes to intervene. So, throughout the main part of the landing, the panzers would have had free rein and could have rejected the Allies to the sea.

7) Hitler’s behavior during the day

After waking up, the behavior of Hitler evidently continued to drive the German army to defeat. Once informed of the situation, he refused to involve the panzer divisions and other available reinforcements in order to, supposedly, wait until the situation is clarified on the north of France. In doing so, the allies could continue to gain a foothold in the Normandy countryside without meeting serious opposition, becoming increasingly entrenched.

Finally, seeing at the end of the afternoon that the North was not attacked, he decided to involve the panzers to “clean up the beaches during the night.” But it was obviously too late.

Some could say that since he did nothing during a big part of the day, the fact of not having been awakened quickly was finally not important. He could have been awakened at 6am and Jewish leaders could have made him do nothing during almost all day with the same phony justifications. But first, it doesn’t remove the illogical behavior of Jodl. And also, yes, it was still important. If Hitler had been woken up at 6am to be notified of the landing, it would have still been much more complicated to justify his inaction for 4 or 5 more hours (5 hours, because, in addition, he has not been informed of the situation right away). The few hours of Hitler’s inaction are already very difficult to justify; so during the whole day, it would have been extremely suspicious. It would have been particularly difficult to explain that he has not released the 12th Panzer and Panzer Lehr much earlier.

By the way, here is the reaction of Hitler when he learned that the landing took place.

His first statement was: “the news couldn’t be better“. “As long as they were in England, we could not reach them. Now, they are in a place where we can destroy them“. Later, at a reception at which he was to attend, his face was radiant and he exclaimed, “it began, finally …“.

Such a reaction is more than strange. He knew that the opening of a second front could be fatal and that he was far from being sure to be able to push back the allies to the sea. And when he learns that the landing occurred and that solid bridgeheads are already in place, rather than feeling anxious and saying that this is probably the end in the short term, he is joyful? This is nonsense.

In my opinion, this reaction was used to justify the decisions of Hitler during this day and the following days or weeks. If he had shown panic or even just anxiety, then, delays in sending panzers to the beaches would have seemed much less normal. So he had to appear satisfied with the situation. It showed that he wasn’t panicked. It also showed that he believed it was a diversion. And since this was a ruse, he had all the time to organize the counter-attack. Therefore, the various delays became logical. And as Hitler was supposed to have become half mad with the years, this aberrant reaction could pass without problems.

8) The idea that the real invasion would be located elsewhere: Operation Fortitude

The idea that the first landing would be a diversion, or that the real invasion would necessarily take place in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais helped justify most fatal delays on the part of Hitler and the German High Command.

This idea was largely created and maintained by the allied operation “Fortitude“. The allies used their very efficient intelligence services to deceive Germans by all possible means and make them believe that the real invasion would be in the Pas-de-Calais. They also created a false army, giving the impression to Hitler that they had 42 more divisions than they had in reality. After landing, he will believe that an army of 57 divisions was still available in England, ready to pounce on the Pas-de-Calais, while there were only 15 divisions left.

And hesitations caused by the Operation Fortitude lasted very long. It’s only at the end of July that Germans will accept the idea that the invasion of Normandy was the only one which would happen. So, the German units in the north of France were not sent to Normandy, or so in dribs and drabs. It was not until August that Hitler finally decided to redeploy the 15th army to Normandy, obviously too late.

Of course these hesitations can be justified. Indeed, there was a very long coastline to defend. And indeed, the Pas-de-Calais is the closest place of England.

But precisely because the coast of Pas-de-Calais was very well defended, the probability that the Allied attack elsewhere, in more accessible areas, became much more important. Even if the Allies were in a strong position there, a landing is still always dangerous. So attacking where the enemy is stronger and better prepared greatly increases the risk of failure during the first hours.

And, after the first few days, it was clear that the landing was going to take place only in Normandy. It was then necessary to massively repatriate units present in the north.

Moreover, once the landing in Normandy started, if Allied forces were not eliminated, it was over; it then became the main landing. So anyway, it was essential to counter it.

But, it would have risked making the invasion unsuccessful. And, precisely, the goal of the Jew Hitler was then to make Germany lose. So, reinforcements had to arrive little by little. German “hesitation” had to be maintained, even if it became more and more ridiculous as the days and weeks passed.

–    The quirks of Operation Fortitude

• • Aerial reconnaissance

If the Germans believed in the presence of an army ready to pounce on the Pas-de-Calais, it is primarily because they have photographed the fictitious camps with reconnaissance aircrafts. A first question arises then: how were the Germans able to fly over the areas where the false allied army was stationed? Normally, the English sky was totally forbidden for the Germans. This is what you can find for example here:

“As the war progressed, the British air defense system virtually eliminated Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights over Britain until September of 1944 when the Germans unveiled the Arado Ar 234, a jet powered strategic bomber and reconnaissance platform with the speed and ceiling to penetrate British airspace.”

Well, the Allied high command gave the order to let pass some of the German reconnaissance aircrafts. Of course, it was not done as simply as that, but flak purposely missed their targets and Allied planes were apparently not there. So, a number of aircrafts of the Luftwaffe could come back from their mission.

At the same time, they continued to shoot down German bombers that had begun to attack England between January and May 1944, allegedly in retaliation against the Allied bombings of Germany (Steinbock operation). Incidentally, 329 German bombers will be lost during this operation. And suddenly, “what a bad luck”, it won’t be possible to oppose a serious counter-attack by aerial bombardment during the invasion of France. Thus, you can think that these German bombings were made specifically for the purpose of not having enough bombers on D-Day.

So, the Allies destroyed bombers which attacked at night; but the German reconnaissance aircrafts, which could not fly over England until then, could make it once again (even though there were of course losses). And it didn’t surprise at all the Germans. Well, of course, it surprised them; but apparently they didn’t reach any conclusion. They did not think it was all wanted and that the allies let them purposely observe their troops in order to trick them in one way or another and that, therefore, there was a problem somewhere. They did not think that what Allies let them observe was not the reality. Come on… Again, it is clear that Hitler deliberately fell into the trap.

Also, German reconnaissance aircrafts were not allowed to take photos below 2,000 meters. Underneath, they would have been able to understand the deception. So, Allied aircraft were ordered to shoot down the planes going down this altitude. Except that here too, it should have strongly put a flea in the ear of the Germans. Allies let a part of their reconnaissance aircrafts pass, while they destroyed the bombers, but as soon as they went down a bit to see what there really was, they cut them down? Extremely fishy, indeed. It further reinforced the idea that what was on the ground was not real and that they let them see those things voluntarily with the purpose of making them worry, but not too close, so they do not understand the scam.

Moreover, the DCA or the air force couldn’t eliminate all the reconnaissance aircrafts. So there was still a huge risk that German planes manage to pass.

Furthermore, the radar could not detect the aircraft below a certain altitude (165 meters). Of course, once arrived over the British soil, visual observation stations could signal the presence of the airplanes. But since many training camps were very close to France and coasts, the pilot had a high probability to carry out its mission and leave before being intercepted. Especially in bad weather, he could hide in the clouds after the mission. In short, it was probably possible for a reconnaissance aircraft to fly at low altitude and take pictures without being shot. So, inevitably, some of them would have managed to take pictures at less than 2,000 meters. Then, they would have seen that the allied army was only a decoy.

It just needed a single plane, one commando group or a single spy to destroy all the efforts of the Allies. And Germans could have acted as if they didn’t know what was going on, while they in fact did. So Operation Fortitude was extremely dangerous.

The Germans had also made false tanks and fake airplanes. So it’s not as if they did not know this kind of trick.

And this phantom army story is nice, but here, we are talking about an army group and the fact that Allies had persuaded Hitler that there were a million men who were waiting there to attack the Pas-de-Calais. So, the Germans would have seen during their aerial observation missions that there was hardly anyone on the ground. There were several thousand veterans who had been recalled for the area is not completely empty. But, between a few thousands or even tens of thousands of men and a million, there is a big difference. A difference that would have necessarily been seen, even at a distance of 2,000 meters.

And what about a small bombardment, to see if the anthill was going to show some agitation and if the material was real? Imagine a strafing and bombing of the area where there were fictitious tanks with reconnaissance aircraft behind (or even made by the later, since they were armed). And there, the Germans who realize that there is nobody or at least not many people that come out of the barracks, and that tanks melt, burn and deflate as if they were made of plastic. It would have been a disaster.

But indeed, without aerial reconnaissance, there was no reason that Germans believe in Operation Fortitude, and therefore, it would have become very difficult to explain that their hesitations have lasted so long after the landing. So Allies had to let the aircraft pass and the German high command had to fall into the trap. The problem is that therefore, it all becomes a little too beautiful to be plausible.

• • Deceiving intelligence services

As basing the deceit only on aerial reconnaissance was still quite flimsy regarding credibility, Jewish leaders were forced to say that the Germans were wary of information obtained by this way. So, they completed it with information obtained by secret services. With aerial observations, plus information from their agents, the belief of the Germans in Operation Fortitude became plausible.

But if the German were suspicious, we fall even more on the issues raised above. Why not do low-level overflights? Why not send commandos? As this army was located southeast of London, the Germans could have parachuted or bring commandos by ship or submarine. But, apparently commando operations were reserved only to the Allies.

Anyway, once again, credibility is not terrible. What we are told is that the English secret services had made fall a big part of the German espionage network in England and had turned most of German agents. So, from this side, they didn’t have much fear of being unmasked.

But, first, they had not destroyed the entire network. And, given the secret nature of secret services activities, it’s always very difficult to be sure you eliminated all spies from a country. And new ones that you have not yet had time to identify can always be brought. So there was a big risk that unidentified agents reveal the deception. In addition, how to be sure that the turned officers weren’t triple agent?

On this list, we learn that 17 German double agents were still working in May 1944. As the entire network had not fallen, there had to be still some that had not been turned. But ultimately, we are told that to determine the validity of the information collected through reconnaissance aircrafts, the German intelligence relied primarily on two secret agents they considered their best, but were actually double agents working for the Allies.

There was Roman Garby-Czerniawski, aka “Brutus“, former head of the Polish-French Allied intelligence network, turned by the Germans with the promise that his 63 companions of network would not be executed. Of course, just after having returned in England, he told them everything and became a double agent working in fact for the Allies. But no problem, the Germans were not suspicious. In late April 1944, he sent messages saying he had spotted in Wiltshire, south-east England, movements of troops and equipment; without specifying, of course, that the tanks were balloons, and men, ghosts.

The other agent was Juan Pujol Garcia, alias “Garbo“, a Catalan who had fought for Franco’s forces in Spain, but who hated the Germans. His history is even more extraordinary, or rather, even more unlikely than that of Brutus. When war broke out, he offered his services to the English, who then refused, wondering who could well be that guy. Then he offered Germans to work for them, making them believe that he would work in London for a pharmaceutical company. The Germans hired him. But Garcia didn’t go further than Lisbon, in Portugal. How did he do then? He just read British newspapers, and with great imagination and a good sense of analysis, he sent reports to the Germans which went off without a hitch. As the English secret services decrypted German messages, they quickly took interest in Garcia and, again, this one proposed his services. They agreed and Garcia became a double agent in the service of England. And during the preparation of the landing, he also sent completely false information.

But that it doesn’t hold one second. The Germans would necessarily have monitored a new recruit coming out of nowhere. And they would have seen that he had not gone to England and that he saw no one in particular. For the first missions, they would have asked for information they could control and also that he couldn’t find only in newspapers. They would have known very quickly that he was a pathological liar. Something which is also true for Brutus by the way. Moreover, he apparently didn’t give them any important information before the landing. So how did he become considered as one of the more reliable agents? This is completely implausible.

So, they want us to believe that the Germans would have made rely most of their field reports on two agents, including one they turned, and one whose story is completely unbelievable. It is not credible at all.

Proofs with photos collected by only 2 or 3 agents loyal to Germany would have been enough to reveal the truth. And then, all the lies of the other agents couldn’t have done anything against that.

It sufficed that there are German agents or contacts in the allied army to make things known pretty quickly. Since the army in question did not exist, either the total secrecy was maintained internally about it, or not. If there had been secrecy, it would have been suspect. If there had been no secret, soon, German infiltrators in the English army would have known that it was only a phantom army.

It is true that the soldiers were confined to their camps so that the least possible information filter about the landing (this was the case for this phantom army and all other armies which had to take part in D-Day). So, it was impossible to see that the activity was too low compared to what it should have been in cities near the supposed training camps.

But precisely, because all the soldiers were supposed to be in the camps in question, then, aerial reconnaissance should have found that the number of soldiers observed was much lower than it should have been. It is true that the army used veterans to animate some barracks and give an impression of life. But necessarily, it couldn’t resemble in any way to the presence of a million men.

And the monitoring of roads would have allowed to see that, here too, movements of troops, trucks and trains toward the camps in question weren’t what they should have been (even if there were movements organized to deceive). A camp inevitably brings heavy traffic, whether for refueling, coal, food, men, etc … By simply monitoring the main roads and trains around the various camps, German agents would have seen soon that, here again, the activity was abnormally low.

Moreover, spies placed in the army or in jobs allowing to monitor the supply activity could have quickly checked that the supplies of goods and services did not correspond to anything real. If, for example, 100 tanks engines were to be delivered and that there was no trace of manufacturing, raw material demand, delivery, etc.., there was a risk that spies notice it. Multiplying this by tens of thousands of such orders, their fictional character was bound to end up being discovered.

In addition, isolating the soldiers in camps, supposedly to keep secret the landing, was finally something more suspicious than anything else. Regarding the secret about the place and date, it was high rank officers who held it. And about the destination of these soldiers, there was not much to hide, since, as the camps were in front of the Pas-de-Calais, this one was pretty obvious. And even if it hadn’t been so for ordinary people, it would have been for the German high command, since they were waiting the Allies to land at the Pas-de-Calais. So why maintain the secret for common soldiers with this method, even though they had no important information to disclose? It doesn’t make much sense. German or Russian soldiers, them, were not maintained in their camps. And if Allied generals did not hide them to avoid revelations about the date of the landing, why not show them, since anyway there was a huge camp, where were located tons of tanks and guns? Finally, it gave much more attention to the possibility that the army in question be ghost. If they completely hid the soldiers, it’s probably just because in some places there were none, and they tried to make Germans believe that there were more than actually.

One could answer that the isolation was used to prevent that German spies report the sudden absence of soldiers in the cities just before the landing. But during the days before this one, massive troop movements to the embarkation points had to necessarily indicate its imminence. Some camps were indeed far from the sea (50-70 km). Incidentally, those movements would have been visible by the German aerial reconnaissance and the spies. And even if troops had been free to go to the towns, the illusion could have been maintained just before the landing by using soldiers having the purpose of maintaining a certain animation. So it was not a critical issue.

By the way, why didn’t the Germans do that in Normandy? They too could have made believe that they had more troops than really. But no, it seems that this tactic was only valid for the Allies.

Finally, this positioning of two large camps areas, one for Normandy and the other, larger, for the Pas-de-Calais, was a little too obvious to be true. If the Allies had wanted to make two separate landings, would have they set up so obviously two distinct areas, thus warning Germans about what they were going to do? And about the number of soldiers, wouldn’t have they rather tried to ensure that the troops be hidden, in order to make the enemy believe that there were fewer than in reality? They would have also put them in more scattered camps, showing less clearly the destination of this or that camp? Thus, they would have benefited from the surprise for the landing in the Pas-de-Calais, instead of being completely expected.
–    Other methods of deception

The rest of the operation was based on false radio messages. But it’s very easy to deceive the enemy that way, and Germans knew it of course. So, there was no reason that they particularly fall into the trap with this technique.

Similarly, we are told that some French resistance networks were sacrificed. They were given false information about the landing. And under torture, they revealed them. Except that, here again, German secret services were not stupid. This is the kind of operation of deceit which is commonly done. So, there was no reason either that the Germans be tricked with this kind of ruse.

–    What it implied for the Allies

Thus, the behavior of the German high command, vis-à-vis aerial information and these two or three secret agents is suspicious. But on the side of the Allies, it’s even shadier.

Indeed, for the operation to succeed, they had to be sure that:

• No German plane would be able to make photos under 2,000 meters
• The German High Command wouldn’t be surprised that all of a sudden, the English sky is open to German airplanes, but only for reconnaissance operations and not for those of bombardment, and only if they were flying over 2,000 meters
• The Germans wouldn’t have the idea to do some bombings, even limited ones, to see if the army was not fictitious
• No commando would manage to infiltrate
• No spy would uncover the affair
• No Allied military would speak

It was a lot of conditions to be met. One could say that it was in any way an operation to try. But the problem is that most of the success of the landing was based on the success of the deceit.

Indeed, if the Germans hadn’t been tricked, the reserve troops would have been sent much more quickly to Normandy. Those of Normandy would probably have been sent to the beaches. And the troops of the 15th army would have been sent en masse immediately; not forgetting those further south. There would then have been a huge risk of losing, right from day one.

So for the landing be successful, it was necessary that the Germans believe that the allied force was much more important than it actually was. Then they had to believe that the allies were bound to land in the Pas-de-Calais; and finally, that they would inevitably make a diversion elsewhere. It was also necessary that Hitler still hesitate after several weeks of invasion and continue to keep the 15th army in the north.

For the first point, ok, but this one didn’t imply inevitably the next two. So, the Germans had no reason to be categorical about the existence of a landing in the Pas-de-Calais and about the existence of a first landing which would be a diversion (that is, that there would be two landings). Now, these two assumptions were important for the success of the operation. If the Germans were not completely sure that the first attack be a diversion, they could send some of their forces in Normandy. If they were not sure that there is a landing in the Pas-de-Calais, then they could repatriate some of the 15th army to Normandy.

So, basing such a crucial operation on the total success of this deceit, while the result was extremely random, was crazy. Especially since even with the total success of this ruse, many German mistakes had to be added to be sure that the operation succeed. It’s pretty incredible that the Allied high command did that, and it’s very fishy. But it becomes much less incredible if they knew very well that Hitler was actually in their camp and would do what it takes to let them win.

The almost ultimate deus ex machina consists in saying that the code of the Enigma machine had been discovered; which meant that German operations were no secret for the allies. They could therefore check that the Germans were biting the bait. How convenient. It is rather amazing that the Germans have never been able to realize. But even with this advantage, it was only useful to see if the Germans had uncovered their guile. It didn’t prevent them to understand it. And even if they didn’t, nothing said to the allies that the Germans would necessarily fall into the trap on the D-day, nor that they would continue to do it the following days. And then, there were yet all the other errors necessary for the success of the landing. So even if we take this into account, the operation of the Allies was still a foolish gamble, and thus was incredible from the Allied High Command.

• • To conclude

Thus, the behavior of the German high command regarding dubious agents and imprecise aerial information is fishy.

The behavior of the allies is highly suspect. To base such an important operation on such a gamble is insane.

Moreover, that Hitler and the generals have believed that the Allies were more numerous than really is one thing. But, as said just before, this belief was not based on very strong evidence. They only had photos taken at high altitude and testimonies of very doubtful agents. And there were strange elements that could make Germans think that the allies were trying to make believe they were more numerous than they really were. So the Germans had no reason to believe so firmly that it was the reality.

But then, that they have deduced the allies would necessarily land in the Pas-de-Calais and make a diversion in Normandy in addition, it’s something else. There was no basis to conclude with absolute certainty that it was going to be. Doubt should have been the rule here. That they were in uncertainty, okay, that they were sure of it, no. So this certainty on the German side is, once again, very strange.

Some will say that Hitler was mad and had obsessions. But it is not only Hitler who thought that; this was the case for most of the leading members of the high command in the west. And it is also because of this that precious hours will be lost on D-Day, when Hitler was asleep.

So it’s still very strange. But for Jewish leaders, it was necessary that the German high command fall completely into the trap, even if it seemed fishy. The success of the Allied operation was based on it.

That the Germans have believed firmly in this fake army and in the false invasion in the Pas-de-Calais until the Normandy landing is already suspect. But, once the landing achieved, even if Germans believed in those lies, the Allies had anyway established themselves firmly and quickly in Normandy. There were always more troops and equipment coming. And the German troops were unable to repel them. So, at a pinch, no matter that there was another landing expected. If the Allied troops in Normandy were not quickly eliminated, the Germans were defeated. So, they had to give priority to the Normandy landing and send all the troops at this location. It was obvious. And that was true after not even two weeks.

So, that Hitler have made the 15th army stay in the north until the end of July remains nevertheless extremely bizarre. But of course, it is no longer strange at all when you understand that Hitler was actually a Jew working for more high ranked Jewish leaders, that the war was staged, and that at that time, he was losing on purpose.

*****

– D-Day was staged too (part 2/2):

9) The reason why the German high command didn’t react the previous days and during the night of June 5/6

• • The time between 2am and 4am

• • The time between 4am and 9am

10) The hunt for paratroopers

As we can see, there are 5 companies of the 726th Regiment, and 2 of the 916th, where the Allied divisions attacked. A German company normally had 145 men. So, theoretically, there were 1,015 men on this part of the beach (725 of the 726th regiment and 290 of the 916th). One of the maps that I could see also talked about a company of the 914th regiment located west of the landing zone. So, in this case there were 1,160 men to prevent the Allies to establish a bridgehead on the beaches.

11) The justification of the German lack of preparation by the bad weather

12) A weather and forecasts a little too perfect

13) The D-Day and illuminati symbols

Summary of various inconsistencies and suspicious elements

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