“You will not see economic growth until you liquidate the debt and liquidate the malinvestment out there,” is the hard truth that former Congressman Ron Paul lays on Bloomberg TV in this wide-ranging interview. Paul is concerned at “the erraticness of the dollar… and its devaluation,” explaining that, “people think the gold price up and down is a reflection of something wrong with gold; no, I say it is something wrong with the dollar.” The topic gravitates to inflation, which Paul explains is far from missing as, “Bond prices go up. Stocks are going up. Housing prices are starting to go back up again. Education costs are going up,” adding that, “CPI is not reliable.” Paul is buying gold, believes “we are in as much trouble as Greece,” and while fascinated by the free market nature of Bitcoin, he notes that while he doesn’t fully understand it, “if I can’t put it in my pocket, I have some reservations about that.”
Central banks are creating the ultimate bubble in money itself, as they fight the downward leg in this Long Wave cycle. This is the biggest debt bubble in history. Each time deflationary forces re-assert themselves, offsetting inflationary forces (monetary stimulus in some form) have to be correspondingly more aggressive to keep systemic failure at bay. The avoidance of a typical deflationary resolution of this Long Wave is incubating a coming wave of inflation. This will not be the conventional “demand pull” inflation understood by most economists. The end game is an inflationary/currency crisis, dislocation across credit and derivative markets, and the transition to a new monetary system , with a new reserve currency replacing the dollar. This makes gold and silver the “go-to” assets for capital preservation.
Strategically, we are far more bullish on equities versus bonds. Tactically, equities face a volatile period – buffeted by alternating cycles of deflationary and re-flationary forces until they overcome bonds as the inflationary endgame unfolds. In that scenario, equity investments should (over time) be aligned with the growing share of real disposable income directed towards essential expenditures, including energy, food/agriculture, personal & household care, mobile telephony and defense (for governments).
The “Inflationary Deflation” paradox refers to the rise in price of almost everything in conventional money and simultaneous fall in terms of gold.
We won’t waste our readers’ time with the details of all the 56 documented instances of hyperinflation in the modern, and not so modern, world. They can do so on their own by reading the attached CATO working paper by Hanke and Krus titled simply enough “World Hyperinflations.” Those who do read it will discover the details of how it happened to be that in post World War 2 Hungary the equivalent daily inflation rate of 207%, the highest ever recorded, led to a price doubling every 15 hours, certainly one upping such well-known instance of CTRL-P abandon as Zimbabwe (24.7 hours) and Weimar Germany (a tortoise-like 3.70 days). This and much more. What we will point is that at no time in recorded history did a monetary regime end in “hyperdeflation.” In fact there is not one hyperdeflationary episode of note. Although, we are quite certain, that virtually all of the 56 and counting hyperinflations in the world, were at one point borderline hyperdeflationary. All it took was central planner stupidity to get the table below, and a paper with the abovementioned title instead of “World Hyperdeflations.”Full table:
The full working paper by Steve Hanke and Nicholas Krus below (pdf)
Here’s Part 2 of my dramatic interview with precious metals pundits Andy Hoffman and Bill Holter. We discuss the clear evidence of the international banking crimes, debate inflation VS deflation and conclude with this FACT: The collapse is happening, and once the Banksters lose what little control they have left, the world in which we live will change forever.
When gold was undergoing its latest (and certainly not greatest) near-parabolic move last year, there were those pundits consistently calling for comparisons to 1980, and the subsequent gold crash. Yet even a simplistic analysis indicates that while in the 1980s gold was a hedge to runaway inflation, in the current deflationary regime, it is a hedge to central planner stupidity that will result as a response to runaway deflation. In other words, it is a hedge to what happens when the trillions in central bank reserves (at last check approaching 30% of world GDP). There is much more, and we have explained the nuances extensively previously, but for those who are only now contemplating the topic of gold for the first time, the following brief summary from futuremoneytrends.com captures the salient points. Far more importantly, it also focuses on a topic that so far has not seen much media focus: the quiet and pervasive expansion in bilateral currency agreements which are nothing short of a precursor to dropping the dollar entirely once enough backup linkages are in place: a situation which will likely crescendo soon courtesy of upcoming developments in Iran, discussed here previously.
Now that even the likes of Joe LaSagna are starting to throw out the R-word about as casually as they did a 4% 2011 GDP target as recently as 2 months ago, it is becoming increasingly clear that the market is pricing in the fact that post a few more historical BEA revisions, the prior two real GDP reads will end up having been, shockingly enough, negative, i.e., your garden variety recession. So where does that put us on a market performance continuum, for those wishing to extrapolate how much further stocks and, yes, bonds (because credit is and always has been a far better indicator of objective market reality) have to drop before we hit the proverbial floor. Well, according to Morgan Stanley, quite a bit lower: “Despite the recent decline in risk assets, we do not believe that recession is in the price. Exhibits 3 and 4 show the typical declines in developed market risk assets in recession. Compared to corrections in past recessions, S&P prices and corporate credit spreads would have more to go, though spreads are starting from a higher level than typically precedes recessions.” What is startling is that should central planners lose all control (and with central bank intervention upon intervention, one can argue that should all artificial props be removed, the market really ought to plunge in a Great Depression-style tailspin), the drop from the April 29 peak to the bottom will be roughly 4 times greater… which means the S&P would hit the proverbial “S&P 400″ which is the long-term target of the likes of some more popular skeptics such as Albert Edwards and Russell Napier. As for credit: watch out below.
And completing the pain, again from Morgan Stanley:
A statue of Albert Gallatin, a long-serving U.S. secretary of the Treasury, stands in front of he U.S. Treasury Building in Washington, D.C. Photographer: David Rogowski/Bloomberg
The Treasury sold $10 billion of five-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities at a negative yield for the first time at a U.S. debt auction as investors bet the Federal Reserve will be successful in halting deflation.
The securities drew a yield of negative 0.55 percent, the same as the average forecast in a Bloomberg News survey of 7 of the Federal Reserve’s 18 primary dealers. The sale was a reopening of an $11 billion offering in April. Conventional Treasuries rallied amid speculation about the amount of debt the Fed may purchase to spur the economy in a strategy called quantitative easing.
“It signals people’s expectation of the Fed being able to create some inflation with the QE program,” said Alex Li, an interest-rate strategist in New York at Deutsche Bank AG, one of 18 primary dealers required to bid at Treasury auctions. “With nominal rates so low, in order have high TIPS breakevens you’ve got to have negative real yields on the five-year.”
Holders of TIPS receive an adjustment to the principal value of their securities equal to the change in the consumer price index, in addition to a fixed rate of interest that is smaller than the interest paid to a holder of conventional debt. The difference between is known as the breakeven rate.